Contingent Credit Lines (CCLs) are widely used in bank lending and also play an important role in the functioning of short-term capital markets. Yet, their pricing and hedging has not received much attention in the finance literature. Using a financial engineering approach, this paper examines the structure of CCLs, develops a method for their pricing, and discusses the problems faced in hedging CCL portfolios.
Introduction
Contingent Credit Lines (CCLs) are widely used by banks for commercial and industrial lending and also play an important role in the functioning of short-term capital markets. A recent survey by the US Federal Reserve shows that almost three-quarters of bank lending is done using commitment contracts, and as of March 2003, the outstanding (unused) CCLs of US firms were close to $1.6 trillion, more than double that in 1990. 1 Yet, the pricing and hedging of CCLs has not received much attention in the finance literature. 2 Recent advances in financial modeling and * The authors would like to thank Ralph Chami, Connel Fullenkamp, Miguel Messmacher, Andre Santos and Felix Vardy for discussions, and Yinqiu Lu and Tala Khartabil for superb research assistance. The usual disclaimer applies. Authors' e-mail addresses: eloukoianova@imf.org; sneftci@gc.cuny.edu; ssharma@imf.org. 2 See the recent survey by Ergungor (2002) . An early exception is Thakor, Hong and Greebaum (1981) who utilize an option pricing approach to obtain the value of the emergence of new liquid option contracts have begun to permit a more detailed analysis of pricing and hedging of CCLs. Using a financial engineering approach, this paper examines the structure of simple CCLs and develops a method for their pricing.
A typical credit line contract has the following characteristics. First, it specifies a maximum amount that a financial institution (henceforth a bank ) is committed to lending a client over a given period; this amount is called the commitment. Typically, the client has the right to draw any amount up to the maximum that is committed by the lender. Second, the contract specifies an interest rate that will apply to the amount borrowed or the drawdown. This is specified as a fixed interest rate or, more commonly, as a spread over some reference rate such as LIBOR. Third, the contract specifies the various fees charged by the lender-an upfront commitment fee, an annual fee levied on the total amount committed, and a usage fee levied annually on the undrawn portion of the commitment. 3 Fourth, contingent credit lines contain an escape clause, sometimes called a material adverse change (MAC) clause. Such a clause allows the bank to deny credit if the client's financial condition changes in a substantive way-for example, if the borrower is downgraded. 4 Companies use lines of credit for three general reasons. First, many lines of credit are issued as backstop facilities that give flexibility to issuers in capital markets. For example, companies with unused loan commitments will avoid borrowing during periods when commercial paper (CP) rates have temporarily spiked in the market due to unforeseen events. Second, having a credit line in place signals that the company has the ability to pay for specific transactions and hence reduces credit risk on short term borrowing. In the commercial paper market, for example, back-up credit lines provide "insurance" to the investors for their short-term unsecured lending.
Third, opening a credit line with a highly reputable bank usually sends a positive signal to other financial market participants. It reduces information asymmetries between the company management and the market about the company's financial condition (Fama (1985) ). Normally, credit lines are rolled over after examining the financial health of the company. Renewal is important since it validates a companies credit-worthiness; termination, on the other hand, could be a negative signal about a clients financial health or business opportunities. Hence, clients have an incentive loan commitments and assess the sensitivity of these values to changes in interest rates.
3 Few credit lines, however, carry all three types of fees. Most of them usually have two types of fees: a usage fee combined with an upfront or annual fee. 4 See, for example, Shockley and Thakor (1997) .
to roll over their existing credit lines with the same banks. 5
Mozebach (1999) suggests that, in most cases, banks have considerable access to corporate information, and they are generally in the unique position of having little information asymmetry vis-à-vis the corporates they lend to. Hence, the granting of a line of credit by a bank is a signal of a company's financial viability, and helps reduce the information asymmetry for other market players. Mozebach's paper also
shows that there is a positive and significant market reaction on the protection buyer's stock to the announcement that a credit line has been granted. In addition, the bank implicitly sends a signal about itself, since it enters into a contract to provide funds on demand in the future. Therefore, lines of credit are an important signaling device for both corporates (protection buyers) and banks (protection sellers). Calomiris (1989) provides the framework that is closest to our treatment of contingent credit lines. The paper discusses evidence that bank loan commitments backing commercial paper provide insurance against systemic liquidity risk. The main function of commercial paper back-stops is to be another source of funds during periods of extreme CP market volatility. They are infrequently used and become automatically void if the underlying credit changes significantly. Our paper can be regarded as an attempt to replicate and price such CCLs.
It is worth noting that this paper focuses on CCLs provided by commercial banks to their clients in the private sector. This needs to be stated because central bank lending can also be thought of as a publicly provided line of credit (Goodfriend and Lacker, 1999) . Credit lines provided by central banks have some features in common with those provided by private banks, and other features that are different.
An obvious similarity is that both commercial credit lines and central bank lending can provide liquidity on very short notice. A private line of credit has the potential to shift losses from short-to long-term claimants. Analogously, a public credit line shifts losses from uninsured creditors to the deposit insurance fund or general taxpayers (possibly in more than one country). Another common feature is that 5 It should be pointed out that large, highly visible clients do not benefit much from such signals, because they are also monitored by rating agencies, the financial press, and bank analysts. Smaller and less visible clients benefit much more from the signals sent to the market by the approval of credit lines. The same is true for banks of different size. Large clients tend to use big highly reputable banks for large credit lines, since big banks are able to signal more reliable information to the market. Large lines of credit are usually underwritten by a syndicate of lenders, with a big financial institution being the lead manager. both types of credit lines provide only partial insurance, but even partial insurance is valuable for protection buyers as a smoothing mechanism for the cost of contingent funding among different states of the world. Private providers of credit lines have the ability and incentives to constrain credit to insolvent firms when appropriate.
In contrast, there is a critical policy problem regarding how to limit central bank lending to socially appropriate circumstances. A private bank can limit large loans by invoking covenants and reducing or denying credit. A central bank may have greater latitude but is also restricted in the amount of money it can provide if a large bank or a group of banks default. Another difference between these types of loan commitments is that the central bank does not levy an upfront commitment fee and the interest rate charged may be below market rates, although one could argue that central bank lending comes packaged with regulatory and prudential compliance.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses the market for CCLs. Section 3 deals with modeling a canonical credit line. Section 4 provides a replication strategy for the basic credit line. Section 5 specifies a method for pricing CCLs and, using Monte Carlo simulations, examines how the CCL price is affected by varying the contract parameters and changing certain market assumptions. The last section concludes.
Market practice
In short-term capital markets there are at least three standard types of financing for investment grade borrowers. The first is the syndicated loan market for relatively large issuers. The second is the commercial paper (CP) market where high grade issuers can borrow to finance their daily operations. And third, there are CCL facilities or CP backstop loans that are mainly associated with CP markets and other operations.
In this paper, we focus on this third category. In 2001, total volume of CP backstop facilities in the US was around $ 290 billion. 6 Such credit lines are generally opened by prime borrowers and carry various types of fees. Before we formally model such contracts it is useful to describe current market practices. Reviewing some of these practices will motivate certain features of the CCLs:
• Participation fees. Large contingent credit lines are issued by bank syndicates.
The banks that participate in these syndicates, are typically paid 1 basis point 6 See, IFR November 2001.
for every $10 million of the loan they underwrite. Obviously, this is a relatively small portion of the total cost of a CCL.
• Undrawn or facility fees. Once the CCL is opened, the borrower pays an annual fee even when the lines are not used. During the year 2001 the facility fees were in the 8-13 basis point range depending on the creditworthiness of the borrower.
• Drawn fees. This fee is the major component of the cost of a CCL. It is the spread over LIBOR on the portion of the CCL that is eventually drawn. • Some of the CCL's have embedded currency options. The options give the borrower the right to draw the loan in more than one currency. Such options make the product more complex but not necessarily more difficult to price. In this paper we will ignore such options. Large CCL's are sold through syndications. The syndicates are often comprised of banks with which the borrower has a close relationship and the CCL facility is routinely extended. From the point of view of the banks, as long as the facility is not drawn, a commitment with original maturity of less than one year carries a zero risk-capital weight. Hence, the preference for maturities of less than a year. For commitments with original maturity greater than one year banks are required to hold half the capital required for regular loans. 8 
Modeling a CCL
To fix ideas, suppose a corporation would like to transfer the risk associated with a low probability event A that may negatively affect its funding opportunities. In our case, this event could be a temporary closing of the CP market to the firm or a temporary spike in CP rates due to some outside shock. If the event A occurs the firm may need to secure some alternative financing and it decides to hedge this risk through a contingent credit line contract.
A CCL is a contract between a bank and a borrower , signed at time t 0 , that specifies the time T till which the contract is valid, the maximum loan amount, $N, that is available and the term of the loan. Any amount, up to the maximum available under the contract, can be drawn at an interest rate that is either fixed at the time the contract is written, or more generally specified as a spread, s t 0 , over some benchmark rate like LIBOR, L t . At the borrower's discretion, this amount can be drawn at any time in the interval [t 0 , T ]. The contract also contains a material adverse clause that could lead to the contract being voided under certain circumstances, like a deterioration of the borrower's credit rating. 9 At regular times {t i , i = 1, 2, .., n} the firm has to roll over a funding requirement of $N in the money market. It pays the LIBOR rate L t i plus the credit spread c t i at the settlement date t i+1 . The CCL contract designed as a CP backstop has the following structure.
1. The contract is written at time t 0 for n periods (say, months or years). The maturity date is denoted by T , with T = t n .
2. The credit line has a maximum size $N . Normally, the borrower can draw any amount up to $N. We assume that when the facility is used the full line is drawn. This simplifies the replication process and can be relaxed by assuming other rules for drawing the line. 10 3. The unused portion of the CCL is subject to a facility fee denoted by u t 0 . In this paper, u t 0 is interpreted as the CCL premium that is paid up front at contract initiation. This is different than market practice, where u t 0 is paid over the contract period as an annual fee. In addition, the drawn portion is subject to a drawn-fee, s t 0 ,expressed as a spread over LIBOR. These fees have subscript t 0 since they are decided when the contract is negotiated and remain constant throughout the contract period.
4. The CCL contract is of the Bermudan-type and the CCL can be tapped only at the predetermined times t 1 , t 2 , .., t n−1 . This is a simplification since in general the CCL lines can be accessed at any time during the life of the contract.
However, if t i − t i−1 is small, this is an innocuous assumption that greatly simplifies the modeling and replication of the CCL.
5. When the credit line is drawn at time t i , i = 1, 2, ..., n − 1, the borrower pays the annual all-in interest cost:
For simplicity, we ignore the participation and the term-out fees.
6. At times t i , the borrower has the option to prepay the amount drawn from the CCL. Thus, if the firm's credit spread in the CP market falls below s t 0 the firm will choose to repay the bank.
7. If an event B occurs at some date t, t 0 < t < T , the CCL contract is automatically voided. For the CCL being considered, event B is defined to be a rating downgrade of the borrower. This is assumed to occur if the time t credit spread observed in the market, c t , exceeds a level H:
where, obviously, we need to have
The structure described above captures many important aspects of CCLs. A simplified version is provided in Figure 1 . They are tools that essentially decrease a company's cost of finance by lowering their credit risk for short-term lenders and by providing (partial) insurance against unforeseen market events. A large issue of CP is likely to be better received by the market if the investors know that the firm has access to a CCL and hence will be in a position to redeem its CP even under potentially adverse market conditions. It is worth noting that in offering a backstop loan or CCL facility, it is not the intention of the bank to lend (possibly) large sums.
Rather, a CCL facility should be seen as a liquidity and credit enhancement, and not as a loan. And any loan that originates from drawing the CCL should be regarded as temporary in nature. The CCL structure described above accomplishes this in the following way. If the corporation borrows from the short-term money markets at time t i , the all-in interest paid will be:
where L t i is again the appropriate LIBOR. Under these conditions, a firm with a CCL facility will draw on it at time t i only if the credit spread in the market exceeds the all-in drawn fee on the credit line:
Once the market spread c t i goes below s t 0 the loan is prepaid, ensuring the temporary nature of the instrument. In contrast, when c t i exceeds the level H, the borrower is downgraded and the CCL becomes void.
8
In this section we show that the CCL contract can be replicated by using two well known instruments written on the credit spread c t -a cap on the credit spread c t with exercise dates t i and a reverse knock-out option on c t .
The first instrument is the Caplet and its associated Cap. A plain vanilla caplet is like a call option written on an interest rate, say x, such that at settlement time
where κ is the cap rate and the δ is the period of the loan expressed in years. In other words, if at the expiration date t i , the interest rate x t i exceeds the specified cap rate κ, the buyer of the caplet gets compensated for the difference.
In our case, instead of the interest rate x t i we assume that the caplet is written on the market credit spread c t i , and that the cap rate κ is the all-in drawn fee s t 0 .
Thus the time t i+1 payoff of the caplet is assumed to be,
Hence, if c t i exceeds the pre-specified level s t 0 , the CP market becomes less attractive than the CCL and the credit line is used (fully). 11 The caplet payoff structure is shown in Figure 2 . Putting together n such "caplets" with exercise dates t i , i = 1, 2, ..., n, in a single contract, we obtain a Cap written on the credit spread c t i .
The second instrument we use in engineering a CCL is a reverse barrier option.
In particular, we consider a knock-out option that is contingent on the "credit event":
If this event occurs, the firm is downgraded and the CCL contract is voided and the bank is under no obligation to provide the loan.
The underlying risk is c t , the credit spread at time t, t 0 ≤ t ≤ t n = T . The replicating portfolio for the CCL structure described above consists of a Cap written on the credit spread c t , combined with a barrier option that leads to the Cap being knocked-out if the event H < c t occurs during the life of the contract. Since the We assume that at exercise times t i of the caplets, the firm could get a loan of size $N from the bank. This loan has an interest cost made up of the floating rate L t i and the all-in-fee, s t 0 . The fair market value at time t of the ith (knock-out)
caplet that expires at time t i can be written as:
where 1 {ct<H, t 0 ≤t≤t i } is the indicator function for the event that the firm is not downgraded before the caplet expires. The term B(t, t i+1 ) is the risky discount on $1 to be paid at time t i+1 and is calculated from the appropriate risky zerocoupon bonds. The valuation equation written above uses the discount bonds with default risk for normalizing securities prices-the t i+1 risky forward-measure is used in evaluating the expectation. This normalization requires that during default the recovery rate is bounded away from zero with probability one. The cap, formed by the collection of caplets, has a value at time t of:
We can now complete the replication process. Suppose the client buys the knockout cap from the bank at the all-in cost s t 0 and, at the same time, obtains a floating rate loan in the money markets that has rates L t i +c t i at reset dates t i . This portfolio will be equivalent to a portfolio of a market loan backed by a contingent credit line written by the bank.
The contract can be described in heuristic terms as follows. The corporation has to make a decision at the dates t 1 , ..., t n on whether to tap the CCL or not.
If the CCL is tapped at the date t i , (by assumption in the full amount) then the corporation pays the drawn fee s t 0 over the L t i rate observed at that time. The loan is for the period t i+1 − t i = δ. 12 At the next date t i+1 , the corporation has two choices. The corporation may decide to pay back the CCL loan and draw it again (i.e. roll it over), or it may want to pay the bank and borrow in the CP market rather than access the CCL. The latter will be the case if c t i+1 < s t 0 .
In this set up the CCL amounts to a sequence of options on a series of floating rate loan contracts struck at the credit spread s t 0 . At t i , the option to draw on the CCL will be exercised if the observed credit spread c t i exceeds s t 0 . This option is "knocked out" if this excess is too much and the corporation is downgraded.
The price of the CCL depends on the underlying L t i , c t i , their volatilities, and other parameters like s t 0 , H, and whether there are options to prepay or extend the maturity of the CCL. Having the prepayment and term-out options, would involve adding two more options to the replicating portfolio.
Pricing
The pricing of the CCL contract cannot use the standard approach for foreign exchange and equity options. Normally, a reverse knock-out option can be priced with reasonable accuracy by combining an American digital option with a regular knockout option. However, in our case the standard approach to pricing knock-out options is not appropriate because we are dealing with interest rates and credit spreads. The standard Black-Scholes methodology has one factor and assumes constant interest rates. In our case there are two factors and we cannot assume that the interest rates are constant.
Suppose for simplicity that the cost of borrowing in the CP market for a firm with no default-risk is L t . 13 The firm buying the CCL has a credit risk represented by the spread c t , and the firm has raised $N in the commercial paper market as of time t. Let F (t, t i , t i+1 ) be the forward LIBOR rate at time t for a loan made at time t i that matures at time t i+1 , where t < t i < t i+1 . We use the notation f (t, t i , t i+1 ) for the forward rate that applies to loans made to a specific firm. Pricing of the CCL contract requires modeling the dynamics of: (i) n risk-free forward rates,
.., n − 1 and (ii) n risky forward rates, f (t, t i , t i+1 ), for loans to a specific firm that are made at time t i and mature at time t i+1 , i = 1, ..., n − 1. The resulting dynamics for c(t, t i , t i+1 ), the corporate credit spread, is derived from
We model the dynamics for F (t, t i , t i+1 ), f (t, t i , t i+1 )and c(t, t i , t i+1 ) in a "riskneutral" environment, using the framework provided by the forward-LIBOR model.
For the forward-LIBOR process we have:
where P t i+1 represents the t i+1 -risk-neutral forward measure. This measure is obtained by a normalization using the time t i+1 default-free pure discount bond price P (t, t i+1 ) and yields a F (t, t i , t i+1 ) process that has no drift 14 . An alternative, that we employ, is to assume that when a firm defaults the recovery rate is bounded away from zero, and normalize using the price of the risky discount bond, B(t, t i+1 ).
Under this forward measureP t i+1 , the forward rate f (t, t i , t i+1 ) is a martingale without drift. Hence, using this approach, only the drift of the risk-free forward rate F (t, t i , t i+1 ) under the forward measureP t+1 has to be specified.
For expositional clarity, we consider the pricing of a single caplet in the CCL structure described in the previous section. Assuming that the caplet applies to the period [t 1 , t 2 ], considerably simplifies the notation. Dropping the i subscripts,
we define the forward rates as F t ≡F (t, t 1 , t 2 ) and f t ≡ f (t, t 1 , t 2 ). 15 The real-world 14 See, for example, Rebonato(2002) . 15 Note that the way it is modeled the risky forward rate dynamics does not include a separate jump component that may account for the default by the underlying credit. This is clearly a convenient approximation that can nevertheless be justified in our case by, (1) We are dealing with back stop facilities for highly rated AAA rated clients with small default probability, (2) Our approach to CCL's is along the lines of Calomiris(1989) that justifies looking at these tools as liquidity enhancers and not as tools of default protection (3) We are considering very short periods of time where credit deterioration from AAA to full default is likely to be very small, (4) The existence of MAC limits the credit exposure, and in case of a big jump in c t , the option knocks out. dynamics of F t , f t and c t are specified as
where the dω (1) t and dω (2) t are standard, possibly correlated, Wiener processes. Under the forward measureP t 2 obtained through normalization using B(t, t 2 ), the forward rate f t is a martingale without drift
where dω
is a standard Wiener process.
To specify the drift of the risk-free forward rate F t , we proceed as follows. We assume that F t follows a mean-reversion model:
where µ is the long-term average rate and β is the speed of reversion. Under the B(t, t 2 ) normalization, E[dω (1) t ] = λ t dt = 0. By adding and subtracting the term λ t σ F F t dt in (15), we get
(1) t is a Wiener process, such that dω
t − λ t dt and E[dω (1) t ] = 0. We assume λ t is a constant and calibrate it by making use of the fact that the caplet price can be calculated in two ways. Black's formula gives a closed form analytical solution. 16 The other is a λ t -dependent simulation based method that makes use of the interest rate dynamics specified in (16) . We choose λ t to equalize the two calculations of the caplet price. 17 Suppose t 0 (t 0 < t 1 < t 2 ) is the contract initiation time and the caplet contract applies to the future period [t 1 , t 2 ] . The payoff at time t 2 of the caplet with a fixed strike rate of K is
16 See, Black (1976) . 17 Note that here we are modeling the risk-free forward rate drift instead of calculating it explicitly under the risky bond normalization. However, this drift is then calibrated to arbitrage-free bond prices.
where N is the notional amount decided when entering the contract, δ is the days adjustment factor, and L t 1 is the LIBOR rate observed at time t 1 . Black's formula for a (at-the-money) caplet price with strike rate F t 0 is (see, for example, Hull (2003))
where, P (t 0 , t 2 ) is the time t 0 value of the relevant default-free bond, the Φ(·) is the standard normal distribution, and σ cpl is the average realized annual caplet volatility. The simulated caplet price is the expected payoff:
We simulate F t using the Euler discretization,
The paths are simulated from time t to time t 1 to obtain
By simulating p (say 1000) paths of F t , we get the expected payoff of the caplet.
The desired λ * is then the λ that makes (18) equal to (19) .
Having calculated λ * , the dynamics of the forward rates are given by
We assume that the Wiener processes driving the two forward rates, f t and F t , have an instantaneous correlation ρ :
The Cholesky decomposition of the covariance matrix of (ω
t ) allows us to express the dynamics of the forward rate processes in terms of two independent Wiener processes W 
The dynamics of f t and F t can be written in terms of W
Since c t = f t − F t , the simulated paths of f t and F t , also yield a corresponding path for the credit spread. One can intepret dW (1) t as a shock to the macroeconomic environment that affects all firms and dW (2) t as an "idiosyncratic" shock that only affects the specific company.
The CCL price is the discounted payoff from the replicating portfolio consisting of the caplet and the associated knock-out option. In the introduction, this price is also denoted by the symbol u t 0 :
where B(t 0 , t 2 ) is the risky discount factor and 1 {ct<H, t 0 ≤t≤t 1 } is the indicator function representing the requirement that the firm is not downgraded before time t 1 .
Simulation results
The structure of the replicating portfolio for the CCL makes two tendencies clear.
The higher the probability that the borrower's credit spread (c t ) will be greater than the negotiated spread in the CCL contract (s t 0 ), the larger is the payoff to the CCL and hence the higher is its price. However, higher credit spreads also increase the probability of breeching the knock-out barrier H, and the increase in this probability tends to dampen the payoff to the CCL.
The simulations are designed to show the effects of σ f , ρ, s t 0 and H on the price of the contingent credit line. We assume that the CCL is for a notional sum of $1
and the values for the other parameters are as follows: σ F = 15%, σ cpl = 15%, β = 0.05, µ = 6.5%, t 1 = 1, t 2 = 2. Volatility of forward rate is the same as the caplet volatility. Since the caplet volatility from 1995 to 2001, fluctuates around the 15 percent level we take that as the value for σ cpl ; µ is an approximate longterm average of the forward rate. For the simulation exercise, we assume the initial values to be F t 0 = 6.7%, f t 0 = 8.3%, c t 0 = 1.6%. Figures 3 -8 show the expected payoff at time t 2 under different parameter specifications. 18 Each figure consists of a 3-dimensional price surface, and associated 2-dimensional cuts that illustrate how the CCL price varies with a specific parameter.
1. Figure 3 shows how the CCL price varies with σ f and ρ when s t 0 and H are held constant at the specified levels. For a fixed ρ, the graph of the CCL price against σ f first increases and then decreases. Initially, as volatility σ f increases it is more likely that c t will exceed s t 0 and the CCL will be drawn. However, as volatility 18 The discount factor for the CCL payoff is obtained under the assumption that the yield curve is flat. Since CCLs are generally short-term facilities, or are "reset" frequently, this is a reasonable assumption. keeps increasing, eventually the "knock-out" effect dominates and the CCL price falls at still higher volatilities.
The effect of varying ρ while keeping σ f constant is slightly more complex. A higher correlation ρ between f t and F t implies that c t is less volatile and the chance of c t exceeding s t 0 and the CCL being drawn, is low. Hence, the CCL price is negatively related to the correlation ρ. For low levels of σ f , this holds true. But for relatively high levels of σ f , the story is different. A high ρ now makes it less likely that c t will exceed H, therefore attenuating the knock-out effect. Thus, at high σ f volatility, the CCL price and the correlation ρ can be positively related.
2. Figure 4 depicts the effect of σ f and s t 0 on the CCL price holding ρ and H constant. It shows that the payoff is a decreasing function of s t 0 , for given levels of σ f , ρ and H. The higher is s t 0 , the lower the probability that the CCL will be drawn, and the hence the lower its price. For fixed H, the higher is s t 0 (< H), the smaller is the range over which the CCL has positive value. The negative relationship between s t 0 and the CCL price, is also brought out by the graph of the CCL price against σ f .
3. Figure 5 looks at the effect of σ f and H on the CCL price, keeping ρ and s t 0 constant. The relationship between σ f and the CCL price is similar to the one seen in Figures 2 and 3 . What is interesting here is that the σ f corresponding to the peak CCL price, increases with H. Intuitively, given ρ and s t 0 , for a higher H, the "knock-out" effect begins to dominate at a higher σ f .
The positive relationship between H and the CCL price is also in line with our intuition. H is the knock-out threshold; if c t exceeds H, the CCL terminates.
The higher the H, the lower is the knock-out probability, and hence the higher the payoff.
4. Figure 6 plots the CCL price against ρ and s t 0 , for given values of σ f and H. It shows that, for high values of ρ,the CCL price is a decreasing function of ρ.
This can be explained as follows: the higher the ρ, the lower is the volatility of c t and hence the lower is the probability of drawing on the CCL. For low values of ρ, the graph is almost flat.
5. Figure 7 illustrates the effect of varying ρ and H on the CCL price, for given values of σ f and s t 0 . As expected, for given ρ, the CCL price increases with
H.
The effect of ρ on the CCL price, however, depends on how large H is relative to s t 0 . When H is relatively large compared to s t 0 (H = 0.08, s t 0 = 0.025), the relationship between ρ and the CCL price is clearly negative-the higher the ρ, the less volatile is c t and hence the lower is the payoff. When H is small compared to s t 0 (H = 0.04, s t 0 = 0.025), the range of spreads for which the CCL has positive value is small, and this is true irrespective of ρ. In this case for low values of ρ, the knock-out effect is larger; as ρ increases, c t becomes less volatile, lowering the probability of hitting H. Hence, the curve is almost flat at low values of ρ, and has a very small positive slope at high values of ρ.
6. implication for the CCL issuer is that, depending on the market environment and the CCL characteristics, if the assumption for ρ is off the mark, the CCL could be dramatically mispriced.
Hedging
We have shown that it may be possible to replicate a basic CCL by a cap that knocks-out if the credit spread exceeds a pre-specified upper-limit H during the life of the contract. The question then arises: can the bank issuing the CCL hedge it by following a procedure similar to that used in constructing market hedges for reverse knock-out options?
There are two major difficulties. First, even under reasonably normal conditions reverse knock-out options are quite difficult to hedge and this is especially so close to their time of expiration. A reverse knock-out option becomes void when it is in the money. When the credit spread c t increases and becomes larger than s t 0 the value of the option increases. But as the credit risk keeps increasing and approaches the H barrier, the value of the option decreases because it may get knocked-out. Thus, the delta of a reverse knock-out is first positive, and then it becomes negative. In fact, as its expiration time approaches this delta pattern becomes more pronounced, and close to expiration the delta can sharply turn from positive to negative for the option holder. Of course, the opposite is true for the option writer. Given such difficulties in hedging reverse knock-out options, some market makers are often forced to treat reverse knock-out option books the way insurers treat their insurance portfolios.
They consider them as unhedgeable and use the principle of diversification to reduce the risk.
Second, a reverse knock out on a credit spread c t could be even more difficult to hedge because constructing the hedge may require the buying and selling of a complex portfolio of default swaps. This is difficult for vanilla instruments and is likely to be even more difficult for credit spread knock-outs. Default swaps are expensive and the market is not very liquid. Also, the cap that we use in this paper will require not only default swaps, but preferably, forward markets in these instruments. Forward markets in default swaps, even if they exist, are definitely not liquid yet.
Hence, the bank may have no recourse but to treat a portfolio of CCL's as an unhedgeable portfolio of risks and manage the risk through diversification. This is essentially how banks manage their loan portfolios and CCL's are no different in this sense.
Another issue is that although a CCL can be designed to reduce credit risk it is also meant to be a temporary solution to a market risk faced by borrowers in the CP market. If the CCL contains ratings provisions (where the knock-out depends on a downgrading of the borrower) and other covenants, then it cannot be considered a pure credit instrument. Even on the credit risk aspect, ratings may not correctly represent the true credit risk associated with the borrower and the bank may have to hedge its exposure with a CDS.
As mentioned earlier, a large proportion of bank lending is done through CCLs.
Yet, hedging CCLs and altering such loan portfolios is difficult through the secondary market. This stems from two factors. First, due to the nature of CCLs and the option to prepay the loans drawn, funding obligations are continual. Second, the secondary market is illiquid due to the fact that CCLs cannot be sold without the consent of the borrower. Often the borrowers are large corporations that have a good relationship with the bank and the contractual arrangements may prevent the sale of the drawn portion of the loan in the secondary market.
Given the non-existence of a secondary market, an alternative for hedging CCLs could be provided by the Credit Default Swap (CDS) market. The problem in this market has been the cost of these instruments. CDS rates are normally higher than the price of the CCL, and would make the fashioning of a hedge too costly under most conditions. Also, the purchase of a CDS on a particular corporation by a bank issuing a CCL to the same corporation would be a negative signal on the underlying credit and may hurt the corporation. Hence, this alternative for hedging is currently not much in use.
Concluding remarks
In this paper we have examined the replication and pricing of a CCL facility to back-up commercial paper issuance. It is shown that the CCL can be replicated by a cap written on the credit spread of the company, where the underlying caplets are reverse knock-out options. In general, pricing CCLs is difficult compared to pricing a simple option, because an option is exercised in full, or not exercised at all, but cannot be "partly exercised" as in the case of a credit line. The CCL structure considered in the paper can be extended in at least two ways. First, one can add a term-out option. Second, one can model the pre-payment of the loans in an explicit way.
In designing the CCL we assumed that the material adverse change (MAC) clause could be specified as a credit rating downgrade or as an upper-limit on the market credit spread. But banks and other intermediaries also offer various types of CCLs to firms that do not have credit ratings or that do not issue commercial paper. For these firms the specification of the MAC clause becomes more problematic. Clearly, the use of a banks internal rating system is fraught with moral hazard. In such cases, the knock-out clause may have to be based on some other reference credit or some market average. Finally, in this paper, we assume constant volatility since we price CCLs over a short period of time. In the case of longer term CCLs, stochastic or time varying volatility may be more appropriate.
